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Abstract
Vittas argues that public and private pillars  are essential  An effective,  proactive,  well-funded,  and properly  staffed
for a well-functioning  pension system.  Public pillars,  supervision  agency would be necessary.
funded or unfunded, offer basic benefits that are  Tight investment rules could  initially be justified for
independent of the performance  of financial markets.  countries with weak capital  markets and limnited tradition
Since financial  markets suffer from prolonged, persistent,  of private pension provision.  But in the long run,
and large deviations from long-term trends, they cannot  adoption  of the "prudent expert" approach with
be relied on as the sole provider  of pension benefits.  publication  of "statements  of investment policy
Funded pillars provide benefits  that are based  on long-  objectives"  (SIPOs) would be preferable  and more
term capital  accumulation and financial  market  efficient.  Various guarantees covering aspects such as
performance.  But they need to be privately  managed  to  minimum pension  levels and relative  investment returns
minimize  dependence on public sector institutions  and  need to be provided  to protect workers from aberrant
avoid government  dominance  of the economy and  asset managers and insolvency of annuity providers,  but
financial  markets.  care  must be taken to address effectively the risk of
The author focuses mainly  on the promotion,  moral hazard.
structure,  and regulation of funded pillars. He discusses  Vittas also argues for greater  individual choice,
the case for using compulsion  and tax incentives, for  including the creation of a dual  regulatory structure.  One
exempting some categories of workers  such as the very  part would involve heavy regulation with constrained
young (under  25), the very old  (over the normal  choice of investment funds, limits on operating fees and
retirement age),  the very poor (those earning less than 40  on account switching,  and strong government safeguards
percent of the average wage), and the self-employed,  and  and guarantees.  This would cater to those workers with
for offering a credit transfer to be added to individual  low risk tolerance. The other part would be more liberal
capitalization  accounts  to encourage  participation  by  but based  on strong conduct rules.  It would offer greater
lower-income  groups.  choice of investment funds, allowing  multiple accounts
A robust regulatory framework with  a panoply of  and liberal account  switching, imposing no  limits on
prudential  and protective rules covering  "fit and proper"  operating  fees,  and providing  no or fewer  state
tests, asset diversification  and market valuation  rules,  guarantees.  This would  cater to workers seeking a higher
legal segregation  of assets and safe external custody,  return and who are willing to tolerate  a higher level of
independent financial  audits and actuarial  reviews,  and  risk.
adequate disclosure  and transparency would be essential.
This paper-a product of the Financial Sector Development Department-is  part of a larger effort in the department to
study the promotion of pension funds.  Copies of the paper  are available free from the World Bank,  1818 H Street NW,
Washington,  DC 20433.  Please contact  Priscilla Infante,  room MC9-904,  telephone  202-473-7642,  fax 202-522-7105,
email  address  pinfante@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at  http://
econ.worldbank.org.  The author may be contacted at dvittas@worldbank.org.  March 2002.  (35 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations  are less than fully polished. The
papers  carry the names of the authors  and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this
paper  are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
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IThis  is  a  revised  and  expanded  version of a  paper that  was  originally  presented  at a  conference  organized  by  the
European Federation  for Retirement Provision and the UK National Association of Pension Funds in Estoril, Portugal in
October  1995.  Variations  of this  paper were  subsequently presented  at  conferences  and seminars  in various  countries
around  the  world.  I  am  indebted  to  Estelle  James,  David Lindeman,  and  Roberto  Rocha for  various  comments  and
suggestions.1.  Introduction
During the  1990s nearly a score of countries,  mainly in Europe  and Latin America,  have
undertaken  major  reforms  of  their  pension  systems.  Most  of these  reforms  have  been  in  the
direction of multi-pillar systems, the advantages  of which were first articulated by Swiss experts
in the early  1960s (Helbling  1991).  Multi-pillar  structures  have  long characterized  some of the
more  advanced  OECD  countries,  especially  Switzerland  and  the  Netherlands  in  Continental
Europe  and  most Anglo-American  countries  around the world.  The World Bank publicized the
benefits  of multi-pillar  pension  systems for developing  countries  in the  1990s  both through  the
publication  and  dissemination  of  a policy  research  report  (World Bank  1994)  and  through  its
operational work around the world (Holzmann  2000).
Except  for their multi-pillar  structure  and contrary  to  some claims  (Orszag  and Stiglitz
2001),  the  reform  programs  of different  countries  are  far  from  identical.  They  exhibit  many
differences  in  the  relative  importance  of different  pillars,  in  the  way  in  which  the  public  and
private pillars are organized,  and in the way the transition is  structured and financed. There are,
however,  a few  basic  features  that  the reform  programs  share  in  common.  They all  involve:  a
restructuring  and downsizing  of traditional  social  security  systems  that operate as  unfunded  (or
partially funded) public pillars; an expansion  in the role of funded private pillars; a willingness  to
allow large foreign financial institutions to play a central part in the management  of accumulated
assets, often  in joint ventures with large local groups;  and creation of a more robust and effective
regulatory and supervisory framework.
This paper does not re-examine the case for a multi-pillar structure  and does not focus on
the relative importance of different pillars.  The financial pressures caused by demographic  aging
are  often  used as  an argument  for moving from unfunded to funded pension  systems.  However,
demographic  aging will  also cause financial  pressures  on funded pillars. Pension contracts are
long-term  contracts  spanning sixty  years  or more  and are  by  definition  intergenerational
contracts  whether  they  operate  through  government  agencies  or financial  markets.  The
argument  in  favor  of multi-pillar  structures  that  underlies  the  approach  of  this  paper  is  the
premnise  that the  evaluation  of the merits  and demerits  of different  pension  pillars  suffers  from
what may be called "empirical  agnosia".  This concept is different from "ignorance", which refers
to  something that some  people know but others  do not. The term "agnosia"  refers to things thatno one knows.  Given  the  long span of pension  contracts,  one  would need  data covering  much
more  than  one  hundred  years  to  be  able  to  assess  the  relative  merits  of  each  pillar.  The
insuperable  problem  that causes  the  "agnosia"  lies  in the  fact  that technology  is in  a complete
state  of  flux  over  such  long  periods.  Not  only  production  technology,  but  also  electronic,
regulatory,  financial  and especially medical  technology undergoes  radical change over such long
periods.  Thus,  in the  unlikely  event  that they became  available,  long-term  data  would be  very
difficult  to interpret.  "Empirical  agnosia"  suggests that despite  any potential  costs,  diversifying
across providers  may  be a more  efficient  policy,  since  it would protect  against the effects  of a
complete  failure of one or other of the pillars.
The  main  focus  of this  paper  is  the  promotion,  organization  and  regulation  of funded
pillars. However,  it is always  important to emphasize  a number of key points regarding pension
systems:
*  The first point is that the primary  purpose, the raison d'etre, of pension systenis is to pay
adequate,  affordable  and  sustainable  benefits.  This  is  a  simple  yet  comprehensive
statement  that  also  covers  social equity  and redistributive  issues  since  pension  benefits
cannot be considered  adequate if they fail to address  the subsistence needs of pensioners.
Many  other  considerations  are  relevant  and  important  such  as  minimization  of labor
market  distortions,  development  of long-term savings,  deepening of capital  markets  and
promotion of economic growth, but they are secondary.
*  The  second  point  is  that  public  pillars,  funded or  unfunded,  are  needed  to  offer basic
benefits that  are independent  of the  performance  of financial  markets. Financial  markets
suffer from prolonged,  persistent  and large deviations  from long-term  trends  and cannot
be relied upon as the sole provider of pension benefits.
*  Third, funded pillars provide  benefits  that are based on long-term capital  accumulation
and  financial  market  performance.  They  need  to  be  privately  managed  in  order  to
minimize  dependence  on funded  public pillars  and avoid government domination  of the
economy and financial markets.
2*  Fourth, if both public and private pillars are needed, arguing that public pillars have lower
administrative costs  is of little relevance.  What is important  is to  seek arrangements  that
minimize the costs of both pillars while promoting higher efficiency.
*  Fifth,  both  public  and  private  pillars  can  be  organized  in  many  different  forms.  The
structure of pension systems in different countries reflects local and historical conditions.
Local conditions  also shape the structure and objectives of pension  reform, including the
organization  and financing of the transition from one system to the next. What may work
well  in  Chile  or  Mexico  may  be  totally  unsuitable  for  Greece  or  Slovenia,  Egypt  or
Tunisia.  The  cost  of  transition,  the  demographic  structure  of  a  country,  the  state  of
development of its financial markets,  and the political  acceptability  of pension reform all
are  important  variables  that  must  be,  and  are,  taken  into  account  in  shaping  pension
reform programs.
The  paper  is  organized  around  ten  basic  questions  regarding  the  promotion  of funded
pillars  and  policies  to  promote  saving  for  retirement.  Most  of  the  discussion  covers  the
accumulation  phase  of pension  systems,  although  some  reference  is made  to the  problems  that
are likely to be faced during the decumulation phase. One of the first questions concerns the need
to provide for compulsory  participation and offer tax incentives. This is followed by a discussion
of  different  ways  in  which  both  compulsory  provision  and  the  offer  of  tax  incentives  can  be
structured. The remainder of the paper then focuses on the different ways in which funded pillars
can be organized. The paper highlights the differences  in approach  around the world, belying any
claims  of uniform  solutions  (Orszag  and  Stiglitz  2001).  It  also  makes  a  number  of practical
suggestions regarding  the implementation  of some policies that would promote retirement  saving
by encouraging participation  in funded pillars and ensuring the safe and efficient management  of
accumulated  assets.
2.  Why Compel And Induce?
Why should governments  be concerned  whether people save enough for their retirement?
In  a  society  that  emphasizes  personal  responsibility,  the  decision  on  how  to  allocate  one's
3income over time should be an individual one. Out of compassion,  a society could provide social
assistance  to  those  who  reach  old  age  with  inadequate  financial  means  for  subsistence  and
survival.  But  why  should  governments  wish  to  encourage  saving  for  retirement:  that  could
provide higher levels of income in old age than those obtainable from social assistance?
The answer is that such  policies have  been popular with  the public.  And they have been
popular  for  three  reasons.  First,  they  protect  society  from  those  who  fail  to  save  in  the
expectation  that they will be catered for when  they reach  old age. This  might be called a  "weak
moral hazard"  since society's willingness to take care of the old homeless  and destitute cannot be
taken for granted.  In fact, the growing number of poorly catered homeless people  in  most high-
income countries,  not to  mention  the  large numbers  of beggars  in  poor countries,  should  cast
considerable  doubt on the relevance  of this argument.  Second, they protect a substantial  minority
of workers, perhaps even a majority, from their own shortsightedness.  And, third, they protect the
non-myopic workers from footing the bill for the myopic ones (James  1998).
Whether  people  (or  at  least  a  substantial  proportion)  are  "myopic"  in  their  saving
behavior should be empirically  verifiable,  but in fact there  are no hard data to  support or reject
such  assertions.  In  the absence  of hard  facts,  one  falls  back  on  intuition  and  inference  from
observed behavior.  Young  people  are more  "myopic"  than the old.  Biologically,  infants clamor
for instant  gratification  and the young  are impulsive,  while the very old contemplate  death  and
the afterlife. Thus, intuition suggests that the young have a higher discount rate than the old.
Poor people  also  tend to  have  a high  discount  rate.  Forcing  poor  people  to  save  raises
some important  policy,  even ethical,  issues.  How  fair is it to compel poor people  to defer their
already  low  level  of  consumption  for  their  future  retirement  needs?  At  an  extreme  level  of
abstraction, depriving poor people of the ability to meet their basic needs may cause their demise,
thus negating any concern about their possible future destitution. But even at a less extreme  level
of abstraction,  poor people (and even middle income people) have other more pressing needs  for
housing,  education  and  healthcare  than  their  future  retirement  needs.  Thus,  compulsory
participation  needs to be properly calibrated  (see below).
4Libertarian  economists  who  favor freedom  of choice  argue  that high  discounters  should
be allowed to save less and suffer the consequences of their choices when they reach old age. The
problem  with  this point of view  is that the discount rate  changes  with age.  Many people regret
later  in  life  their  failure  to  save  more  when  they  were  younger.  And  many  people  like  the
discipline that is entailed in non-discretionary long-term contractual savings plans.
This is perhaps  why both social security and occupational  pensions2 have enjoyed  a high
degree  of popularity  as  long  as  their promises  have  been  credible  and generous.  The  growing
dissatisfaction  with social security around the world stems from the fear that the value of benefits
will  not  be  sustained.  In  many  developing  countries,  the  existence  of  widespread  evasion
undermines  the argument  that  social  security is popular.  However,  widespread evasion  may not
be the result of unpopularity but rather of faulty design and poor administration.  Experience  from
the  United  States  and  other  advanced  countries  suggests  that  a  well-designed,  efficiently
administered and credible social  security system continues  to be popular.
Similarly,  growing concern  about occupational  pensions  derives from the realization that
they depend  on the integrity  and  solvency  of large  employers. These can  no longer be taken  for
granted as employers  change  pension plans in response  to their particular circumstances3. These
problems  suggest  the  need  to  change  the  form  and  modalities  of retirement  saving,  not  to  do
away with compulsion.
Compulsory provision for retirement  can be justified by reference to the myopic  behavior
of a  substantial  minority of people  and the need  to protect both  these people  and the public  at
2  Occupational  pensions  used  to be  compulsory  for most  eligible employees  of companies  that  operated
defined-benefit  plans.  Compulsory  participation is not a feature of defined-contribution  plans,  such  as the
proliferating  401(k) plans of the past two decades  or so, although  employers offer  matching  contributions
and undertake educational and promotional  campaigns to stimulate voluntary participation.
3 In  the United States, both IBM and ATT, two of the corporate giants of most of the 20th century, changed
their employer-based  pension system in recent years, moving  from a generous  defined-benefit  system to a
less attractive cash-balance  system.  In both cases,  the companies  acted without adequate consultation  with
covered  employees,  causing  the  latter  to  campaign  publicly  against  the  proposals  of  their  respective
companies.  Both  IBM and  ATT  have  faced  difficult  conditions  in  competitive  markets.  Their change  of
approach  underscores  the  importance  of  employer  solvency  and  integrity,  neither  of which  should  be
accepted  without question.
5large from their shortsightedness.  But how much compulsion?  In most countries, participation in
a  social  pension  system  involving  some  redistribution  (and  therefore  sharing  of  costs)  is
compulsory but participation in private pension plans is voluntary (or quasi-voluntary).
Clearly,  ensuring  a  minimum  pension  level  offers  greater  justification  for  compulsory
provision than ensuring a pension level  that implies  maintenance  of a pre-retirement  standard of
living  and  a  high  replacement  rate  of pre-retirement  earnings.  But  as the real  value  of  social
security  pensions  declines,  the  case  for compulsory  participation  in private  pension  plans  that
promise a modest but satisfactory overall replacement rate becomes  stronger.
If  the  principle  of  compulsory  provision  is  accepted,  why  are  tax  incentives  also
desirable?  Tax incentives  may provide a powerful  inducement  to promote compliance  and thus
encourage  long-term saving  for retirement  purposes. Tax  incentives  could also be used for other
objectives  such as saving  for housing, education  and medical care.  Whatever  the objectives  and
modalities of saving, a combination  of compulsion and inducement  is likely to be rnore powerful
than either one in isolation.
3.  How  To Offer Tax Incentives?
The  social  desirability  of  long-term  saving  for retirement,  the  need  to  overcome  the
shortsightedness  of a  large  minority  of people,  and  the  need  to  encourage  compliance  are  the
main  justifications  for  the  use  of  both  compulsion  and  inducement.  However,  the  more
interesting  question  is not why  but  how  to impose  compulsion  and  how  to offer  inducement?
This paper discusses  first the modalities of tax incentives and then considers  the implications of
compulsory provision.
In analyzing the tax treatment of retirement saving,  a distinction is usually drawn between
regimes  that exempt contributions  and investment income but tax pensions  (the EET regime)  and
those that tax contributions  but exempt investment income and pensions (the TEE regime). These
two regimes have different cashflow effects because of differences  in the timing of tax payments,
but their long-term impact can be the same.
6Many countries use the TEE concept for compulsory  social pension systems and the EET
approach for voluntary company or personal pension plans. Switzerland  is a notable exception as
it applies consistently  the EET  approach to both social  and occupational  pension plans4. It is also
worth  noting that there  are countries  with  a TTE regime  (New  Zealand  after  1988 when  fiscal
benefits  on  occupational  pension  plans  were  removed),  others  with  an  EEE  regime  (e.g.
Singapore)  and  still  others  with  a T  regime  (e.g.  Russia  for some pension  plans  in the early
1990s).
Most countries  that  operate  an  EET  regime  impose  limits on  the two Es.  First,  upper
limits  are  placed  on  the  rate  of tax-exempt  contributions  that  can  be  made  to  pension  plans.
Second, there is a ceiling on eligible earnings,  although South Africa and Switzerland are notable
for the absence of any such ceiling.
With regard to the second E, most countries exempt investment income from income tax.
Because  the  assets  commanded  by pension  funds  have increased  dramatically  in recent  years,
some  countries  have imposed  limits  on  the exemption  of investment  income  (Davis  1995).  In
Denmark, this takes the form of upper limits on real rates of return (i.e. any investment income in
excess of a specified  limit of real  returns is liable to tax),  while the Netherlands  subjects to tax
any investment  income  arising  from  surplus  assets  in  overfunded  plans.  The Dutch  approach
makes  more  sense  than  the Danish  approach,  although it faces  the  difficulty of identifying the
level of overfunding,  which can be quite controversial in defined-benefit plans. Several countries,
including Australia,  South  Africa and Sweden,  impose  tax on  investment  income  at  a reduced
rate.
Many countries  also allow  partial  commutation  of pension  benefits  into  a tax-free  lump
sum so that pension benefits are only partially taxed. Thus, one can realistically argue that the tax
regime is "eet" (i.e. lowercase rather than uppercase)  in most countries.
4Switzerland  is also notable  in that it imposes no ceilings  on the contributions  to both compulsory  pillars,
although there is a proposal under discussion to place a limit on the tax-exempt contributions to the pillar of
occupational pensions (Queisser and Vittas 2000).
7An  EET  regime  that  provides  tax  exemption  of contributions  at  the marginal  tax  rate
avoids  the  double  taxation  of retirement  savings.  But  it  offers  a  tax  deferral  benefit  that  has
greater value for high-income workers,  the more progressive the scale of income taxation and the
greater the income disparity between active working and passive retirement  life.
In  this sense,  the EET  approach  can benefit  high-income  workers  much more  than low
and middle  income  ones.  To  mitigate this problem,  the  tax exemption  of pension  contributions
could be limited to the basic rate of tax, thus eliminating the favorable treatment of high-income
workers5.
But an EET approach,  even if limited to the basic rate of tax, would entail no benefit for
non-tax-paying  workers.  A  more equitable  solution  would  be to  replace  tax  exemption  with  a
credit transfer system that would offer the same tax incentive  to all workers.  This could take the
form of a direct government  contribution to the retirement  saving accounts of individual workers.
It would represent  a government  subsidy  or a  form of negative  income tax linked to saving  for
retirement.
The Czech Republic  uses a plan that comes very close to this approach.  The govemment
makes a contribution  that matches  the contribution made by participants  in pension plans, up to
relatively  low limits.  Despite the small amounts  involved,  participation in the voluntary  pension
pillar  in the  Czech  Republic  has  been remarkably  high.  But  by failing to  link the  government
subsidy  to  a minimum  contribution  rate,  the  Czech  scheme has  encouraged  small  amounts  of
saving rather  than  adequate  saving  for retirement.  The  average  contribution  rate  in  the Czech
Republic  is less than 3 percent (World Bank  1999). An easy way to correct this plan would be to
require  a  saving  rate of at  least  10  percent  of a worker's  earnings  for  the payment  of a  given
amount of credit transfer.  In the Czech Republic, penalty-free withdrawals  from these subsidized
accounts  were  initially  allowed  after only  15  years,  although  this  was  changed  to  25  years  in
2000. Allowing withdrawals  only on retirement  would be more consistent  with the  objective  of
promoting retirement  savings.
SA tax exemption  at the basic rate of income tax is equivalent to offering a tax credit against a person's tax
liability rather than taxable income.
8A government co-contribution  to the compulsory  private pension pillar was envisaged in
Australia  in  the  early  1990s.  The co-contribution  was  scheduled  to be  gradually  phased  out as
incomes  reached  average  earnings.  But this  plan  was  abandoned  when  a new  government  was
elected  in  the  mid-1990s.  The  Mexican  government,  as  part  of  the  pension  reform  program
implemented  in 1998,  deposits one "indexed" peso a day to each retirement saving account under
its  compulsory  system.  This  may  explain  the  high  ratio  of  contributors  to  affiliates,  which
exceeds 75 percent in Mexico against less  than 50 percent in Argentina and Chile.  In the United
States  payment of a matching  contribution  by employers  provides  a strong  stimulus  to expand
voluntary  participation  by  workers  in  company-sponsored  401(k)  plans.  The  much  discussed
government co-contribution  to so-called  universal savings  accounts could also  be described as a
credit transfer system.
This approach would eliminate the preferential  treatment of tax-paying workers and could
also contain  the  tax cost  of these exemptions  or achieve greater redistribution  in  favor of low-
income workers  for a given  tax  cost. From a  social  point of view,  it would be superior  to the
other approaches as it would encourage saving by low-income workers.
Compliance by middle and high-income  workers  might decline under such a regime,  but
then high-income  workers would be among  the less likely workers  to require either compulsion
or inducement  for  saving  for  their  old  age.  However,  a  government  could  allow  tax-exempt
contributions  by middle  and  high-income  workers  within  a  specified  band  of income.  Thus,  a
CEET regime,  offering  a credit transfer (government  co-contribution)  to all workers,  exempting
contributions  within  a  specified  band  of  income,  exempting  investment  income  and  taxing
pensions, would encourage participation  by both low and high-income  workers and would avoid
or at least reduce the problems of regressivity  of alternative approaches.
Tax  incentives  have  opportunity  costs  for  the  government  and  their  use  may  be
ineffective  if they  lead  people  to  shift their  savings  to  tax-favored  forms  without  any  overall
increase  in  long-term  savings.  Moreover,  visible  tax  incentives,  such  as  the  credit  transfer
involved in a CEET regime, may give rise to more objections than indirect,  less visible ones, like
9tax exemptions.  But despite such objections,  there can be little doubt that tax incentives are very
powerful  tools in encouraging participation in pension plans and thus promoting compliance.
4.  Who Should Be  Compelled?
Once  a  decision  is  taken  in  favor  of compulsory  provision,  several  important  policy
questions  arise.  Who should be compelled?  What form should compulsory  participation  take?
How much should be saved for retirement purposes?  What type of benefits should be  provided?
Who  should  manage  the  accumulated  funds?  What types  of regulation  would be necessary?
What  protection  and  guarantees  should  be  provided  by the  state?  How  much  choice  should
individual workers have in a compulsory  system?
Most  countries  with  mandatory  funded  pillars  impose  compulsory  participation  on
workers in dependent  employment.  Self-employed  workers are usually not covered, because it is
difficult  to  ascertain  their  incomes  and  monitor  compliance  and  perhaps  also  because  self-
employed workers  are  considered  to be  sophisticated  enough  to look  after their own  long-term
interests.  Chile, Switzerland  and Australia among  countries  with  mandatory fully funded pillars
follow  this  approach.  In  contrast,  Argentina  has  imposed  compulsory  participation  on  all
workers,  including those in self-employment.  However,  compliance by self-employed  workers is
very weak.  In  Chile, where  participation  by self-employed workers  is voluntary,  only one in ten
choose to contribute in an active and systematic way6.
But  there  are  other  aspects  to  this  question.  A  fairly  strong  case  can  be  made  for
exempting some groups of workers. For instance,  young workers (say, those under 25)  as well as
older  workers  above  the  normal  retirement  age  could  be  exempt.  The  Netherlands  and
Switzerland  exempt  workers  under  25  from  contributing  to  funded  pillars,  while  several
countries (including  Singapore) allow older workers either not to contribute at all or to contribute
at  reduced  rates.  Young  workers  should,  however,  be  covered  by  term  life  and  disability
insurance, especially if there is no separate unfunded public pillar in operation.
6 Self-employed  workers may opt to register with a private pension fund for various  reasons but may fail to
maintain an active contribution  record. This is the prevalent  experience in Argentina.
10Workers  with  very  low incomes  could also be exempt.  Switzerland  uses  the concept  of
"coordinated  earnings"  and requires  compulsory contributions  on earnings  falling within  a band
that  is set  annually  and corresponds  to  between  40  and  120  percent  of average  economy-wide
earnings.  In  this  way,  Switzerland  attains  an  admirable  integration  of its  unfunded public  and
funded  private  pillars.  As  low-income  workers  receive  a  high  replacement  pension  from the
public pillar, the  Swiss approach  avoids forcing low-income workers  to oversave  when they are
young  and receive  unduly high  replacement  pensions  when  they  are  old7. This  feature  is  not
found in the new pension systems of Argentina, Hungary and Poland. This may discourage active
participation  by low-income workers in these countries8.
Another group of workers that could be exempt are those that have strong philosophical
objections  to  a  government-imposed  compulsory  participation  in  retirement  saving  plans  (see
below).
5.  What Form Of Compulsory Participation?
This generally  concerns funded plans that generate  long-term savings. Increasingly,  these
plans  are of the defined-contribution  variety and tend to be  fully funded, fully vested and fully
portable.
This  is  not  the  place  to  discuss  extensively  the  merits  and  demerits  of  defined-
contribution  and  defined-benefit  plans.  Occupational  defined-benefit  plans  provide  some
retirement income insurance  (Bodie  1990). But it is now increasingly recognized that the value of
this  insurance  is  contingent  on  the  integrity  and  solvency  of employer  plans,  on  continuing
7  Such  an  approach  would  exclude  self-employed  workers  with  very low earnings  and could  provide  an
additional  justification  for  exempting  all  self-employed  workers  from  compulsory  participation  to  the
funded pillar.
'The  treatment of unemployment  spells, maternity  leave, military service,  and university education creates
complications  that may have a  serious effect on defined-benefit  final  salary plans,  though their impact on
defined-contribution  systems  would  be  less  important.  Some  countries  (e.g.,  Switzerland)  require
compulsory  contributions  on all types of income,  including  unemployment  and disability  benefits,  to their
unfunded  public pillars but not to the funded private  pillars.  This  policy would  be consistent  with a high
level of integration of the two pillars.
11employment  with the same employer,  and  on the treatment  of pre-  and post-retirement  inflation
(Bodie and Merton  1992).
Historically,  occupational  pension  plans  played  an  important  role  because  of  the
underdevelopment  and weakness of long-term insurance  and financial  markets,  even in the most
advanced  countries.  Initially,  they  conferred  no  vesting  or  portability  rights  and  only  retiring
workers  received  benefits.  Workers  changing  employment  in  mid-career  could  not  transfer  their
accumulated pension rights to their new  employers.  Company pension plans  effectively operated  on the
so-called  "Tontine"  principle  of insurance,  which pays all accumulated  capital  to the last survivor of a
group.  Coverage  of company  pension  plans  was  small  and  their cost  was  low.  Most  plans  were  not
funded.  When funding started it took the form of book reserves and only over time this shifted to
holding  external  assets,  first  government  and  other  bonds,  then  equities,  and  more  recently
international  securities.  As  financial  markets  became  stronger  and  employment  patterns  less
stable  and as  regulation  of pension  funds  and protection  of the rights  of employees  increased,
there  has been  a slow but steady trend away from defined-benefit  to defined-contribution  plans.
This  trend  is  more  prevalent  in  Australia,  New Zealand  and  South  Africa,  but it is  also quite
pronounced  in Switzerland  and the United  States  and is spreading in other countries  with large
occupational  pension plans  (such as Canada, Ireland,  the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).
Defined-contribution  plans  can  deal  more  effectively  than  defined-benefit  plans  with
vesting  and  portability  rights,  which  are  increasing  in  importance  as  employment  patterns
become  less  stable.  They  can be  fully funded  almost by definition  provided they  are based  on
actual individual capitalization  accounts. But they transfer the performance  risk of pension funds
to workers.  This can be reduced by using properly diversified portfolios  and more sophisticated
annuity products (Bodie and Crane 1998, Burtless 1998, Alier and Vittas 2001).
Some  countries  combine  defined-contribution  plans  with  targeted  pension  levels.  The
best example is Switzerland,  which specifies the obligatory part of its funded pillar as a defined-
credit  system'  with  the  ultimate  objective  to  achieve  a  targeted  pension  level  at  retirement
9  This is broadly similar to the cash-balance  plans  introduced by many company plans in the UJnited  States
over the past fifteen years or so. However, in the Swiss system, the minimum legal requirements  are spelled
12(Smalhout  1996,  Queisser  and  Vittas  2000).  Optional  variable  contribution  rates  may  also
contribute  to the attainment of targeted  pension levels (Vittas  1993).  Variable  contribution rates
are effectively allowed for in most countries  that operate DC plans, although  their role could be
made more explicit in the relevant pension laws.
6.  What Rate of Saving (Contribution)?
The  answer  to  this  question  depends  on  what  is  considered  an  appropriate  targeted
pension level and on whether there exists a separate  redistributive  public pillar. Experience  from
Latin America  suggests that a contribution rate  for long-term capital  accumulation  of less than 5
percent would not be adequate.  An additional 2 to 3 percent would be required to cover operating
fees and premiums for term life and disability insurance.
In  Chile  the total  contribution  rate  used to  be  around  13  percent  --10 percent  for long-
term capital  accumulation  plus  around 3 percent for operating  fees and insurance premiums.  In
recent years, the latter started to fall, reaching  2.1 percent in 2000.  In Argentina, the contribution
rate for the second  pillar amounts to  11  percent (7.5 percent for long-term capital accumulation
plus  3.5  percent  for  operating  fees  and  insurance  premiums).  In  Mexico,  the  rninimum
contribution rate is 6.5  percent to the individual  retirement account plus another 5 percent that is
credited  to  an  account  operated  by  a  housing  finance  institution.  The government  adds  a  flat
contribution  that  corresponds  to  around  2.5  percent  of  the  average  wage.  Operating  fees  are
deducted from  these contributions,  but disability and term life  insurance  (which covers  survivor
benefits)  is operated  by the traditional  social  security institution, IMSS, and involves  a premium
of 2.5 percent.  In Hungary, the contribution rate  to the compulsory  funded pillar was initially set
at  6  percent,  with  provision  for  its  increase  in  two  annual  steps  to  8 percent.  However,  the
government that took office in  1999 has indefinitely postponed implementation  of this provision
and  has  frozen the contribution  rate  to 6 percent.  In  Switzerland  there is no minimum  required
contribution rate.  Swiss  law only requires  that employer contributions  are at least equal to those
of employees.  In  practice,  employers  cover  two-thirds  of annual  contributions.  The  minimum
out much more clearly and also include  the decumulation phase (a fixed minimum annuity conversion factor
is  specified).
13legal requirement  is for credits  to be made to notional  individual  accounts  based on a worker's
age combined  with a  mninimum  notional  return  of 4 per cent per year.  Plans  that achieve  high
investment returns may operate with zero contribution  rates.
In general,  a rate of 10 percent for long-term capital  accumulation  would be adequate for
a reasonable  replacement  rate of between  40 and 50 percent if investment  returns  exceed  wage
growth  rates  by 2  to 3 percentage  points and if active  working life is at  least twice  as  long as
passive  retirement  life  (the  latter  calculated  to  include  the  life  expectancy  and  benefits  of
dependent  survivors  --  Vittas  1993).  A  lower replacement  rate  would be  achieved  if the  gap
between  investment returns and wage growth is smaller or if careers  are interrupted. Under these
conditions,  a  10 percent contribution rate would still be adequate if the targeted  replacement rate
from the funded pillar  amounts  to 35  percent  and this is supplemented  by a pension  oi  similar
magnitude from the unfunded public pillar.
7.  What Benefits?
Benefits  can  take  several  different  forms:  lump  sums  on retirement,  lifetime  pensions,
pensions  for  surviving  dependents,  pensions  for  disability,  and  withdrawals  for  housing,
education and healthcare.  Historically,  there was  a clear distinction  between provident funds that
paid  benefits  in  lump-sum  form  and  pension  funds  that  offered  life  annuities.  Over  time,
however,  the  distinction  became  blurred.  Most  pension  funds  now  allow  commutation  into  a
(tax-free)  lump-sum payment  of  up to  one-third of the  present  value  of accumulated  balances,
while  provident  funds  require the  purchase  of a minimum-sum  annuity.  Singapore  introduced  a
minimum-sum  annuity requirement in 1988.
Pension  systems  that are based  on  personal pension  plans  require either the  purchase  of
life  annuities  or  the  use  of scheduled  withdrawals  (also  known  as  income  drawdowns  in  the
United  Kingdom  or  allocated  annuities  in  Australia).  Scheduled  withdrawals,  which  were  an
innovation  of the Chilean  pension  reform  of 1981,  are recalculated  annually,  taking  account of
investment  returns  and the  remaining  life expectancy  of pensioners  (and their dependents),  but
they do not provide  longevity insurance.  In  Chile, and other countries  following  its  lead, lump-
14sum withdrawals  are allowed if the annuity payment  exceeds  a certain replacement  rate (usually
70 percent of reference salary).
In  designing  pension  systems  a  differentiation  of  compulsory  accumulation  from
compulsory  annuitization  is  advisable.  This  is  because  private  annuity  markets  suffer  from
structural problems  and are not well developed  even in the most advanced countries'°.  To a large
extent,  the  underdevelopment  of  annuity  markets  is  due  to  the  crowding  out  effect  of  social
security  and  occupational  pensions  that  predominate  in  advanced  countries.  Pending  the
development  of  more  efficient  annuity  markets,  it  would  be  preferable  to  limit  compulsory
annuitization to a level of around 35 percent of average earnings and subject any excess balances
to scheduled withdrawals, but with flexible arrangements  for major health and other emergencies
(Blake et al 2000, James and Vittas 2000).  The development of variable annuities with floors and
caps  as  well as  the  use of more  transparent  participating  annuities  could  address  some  of  the
problems facing  annuity  markets.  The  35 percent  target  should  apply  to the  combined pension
from the unfunded public pillar and the private funded one. Thus, workers should be encouraged
to accumulate  enough retirement  savings  to support  a replacement  rate of around 70 percent  of
pre-retirement income,  but only half of that should be required to be annuitized.
In addition to benefits  for retired workers,  pension systems need also to provide disability
insurance  to cover active  workers  and their dependents  from the effects of serious  accident  and
term  life  insurance  to  protect  the  dependents  of  active  workers  in  case  of  death.  In  Latin
American countries,  these insurance policies are organized on a group basis,  a feature that lowers
costs and could also be used in annuity business.
Other  benefits  for  active  workers  could  include  provisions  allowing  pre-retirement
withdrawals  for housing, education,  health care  and various emergencies  (e.g., funeral  or wedding
'0  These  structural  problems  include  the  impact  of adverse  selection  due  to  asymmetric  information  and
socioeconomic  factors (Friedman and Warshawsky  1990, Blake 1999, Brown 1999, James and Vittas 2000).
Because annuity contracts  are irrevocable,  inflexible and nonportable,  they require considerable  trust in the
long-term  solvency  and  integrity  of  annuity  providers.  The  latter  is  weakened  by  the  considerable
uncertainty  regarding  long-term improvements  in longevity  and the reinvestment  risk emanating  from the
duration mismatching  of assets and liabilities of annuity providers.
15expenses).  Many countries allow use of pension or provident fund balances for such purposes. Too
liberal use for non-retirement  purposes runs the risk of depleting accumulated balances  and leaving
too little capital for retirement.  Alternatively, it may cause the mandated contribution rate to be too
high  as  is  notably  the  case  in  Singapore.  On  the  other  hand,  a  blanket  prohibition  of  early
withdrawals for housing, education and healthcare  would unfairly penalize low and midclle-income
workers  and  would  weaken  support  for participation  in  retirement  saving  plans.  A compromise
solution would be to permit a certain amount of withdrawals but subject to some sensible aggregate
limit.  In addition, repayment  of early withdrawals or replenishment  of account balances could also
be  required.  A  sensible  aggregate  limit  could  allow  withdrawals  equal  to  100  percent  of
accumulated  balances  or 30 percent of projected balances  at normal  retirement  age,  whichever is
lower". In this way, young workers would be bound by the first limit, while older workers would be
bound by the second limit'2.
8.  What Institutional Structure?
The  institutional  structure  of funded private  pillars,  which  affects  the  administ:ration  of
accounts,  collection  of contributions,  payment  of  benefits,  and  management  of accumulated
assets,  is one of the most  important  aspects  of the functioning  of compulsory  pension  systems.
There are two basic choices:  between  centralized public  and decentralized  private management;
and,  in  the  latter  case,  between  company-based  closed  funds  and  open  funds  managed  by
specialized financial institutions.
With  regard to  the  first  choice,  experience  in  both developed  and developing  countries
shows that private  decentralized  management  has  achieved higher efficiency,  a better quality of
service  and  higher real  returns than public  centralized  management.  The rare exceptions  to this
1 "Allowing early withdrawals  could mitigate any  opposition  to investment rules that prohibit the  extension
of  loans  to  members.  In  many  developing  countries,  employer-sponsored  provident  funds  play  a
multifaceted role as short-term saving clubs, loan-granting credit unions, and retirement saving plans.
12 Reverse  mortgages could  be used  to provide liquidity to  old people  who have invested  heavily  in their
own houses and end up being "asset rich" but "income poor". Reverse mortgages  are an interesting concept
but have yet to be successfully  implemented  in any country. They raise some important policy issues, such
as  how  to  protect  very  old  people  from  aggressive  selling  agents  and  how  to  ensure  that  insurance
companies would be able to meet their financial obligations.
16pattern, exemplified  by the high operating efficiency  of the Central Provident Fund of Singapore
and the Employees'  Provident Fund  of Malaysia,  serve  to confirm  this rule.  However,  even  in
these countries,  and especially in Singapore,  the real rate of return credited to workers'  accounts
has  been  very  low,  despite  the pursuit  of sound macroeconomic  policies  and the  attainment  of
high economic  growth with low inflation  (Valdes-Prieto  1998).  In  many countries, especially  in
Africa and Latin America,  the investment performance  of central public sector agencies has been
disastrous (World Bank  1994) and the quality of service has been very poor. In OECD countries,
private  pension  funds  have  generally  achieved  higher  investment  returns  than  public  pension
funds (Davis 1995), while the quality of service of private funds has also been superior.
Supporters of centralized  public management  point to the lower marketing and operating
costs of public agencies  and argue that the lower investment returns of past experience were due
to  failure  to  ensure  the  insulation  of  fund  management  from  political  interference.  Several
countries,  including  Belgium,  Canada,  France,  Ireland,  Norway,  and  Sweden,  have  created  in
recent  years public  pension  funds with better incentives  to attain  higher investment returns  and
strong  safeguards  for  insulation  from  political  interference.  However,  in  all  cases,  the  public
pension  funds represent  a fraction  (in some cases very  small)  of total pension  fund assets under
management.  Moreover,  the new investment rules for such public funds have yet to pass a test of
political  interference.  Proponents  of  an  effective  nationalization  of pension  fund management
(Orszag  and Stiglitz  2001, Heller  1998) underestimate  the implications  of a vast public  agency
not  only  for  political  interference  in  corporate  governance  and  performance  but  also  for  the
functioning and innovation record of financial markets.
The  choice between closed  and open  funds  is  a more delicate  one.  A weakness  of open
funds,  such as those found in Chile, Argentina  and other Latin American  countries, is their high
level of operating fees. This is mainly due to high selling commissions  and other marketing costs
and  is related to the  right given  to  workers  to  switch their accounts  among  competing  pension
fund management  companies.  Employer-based  pension funds have much lower operating costs,
mainly because they avoid these marketing costs (Rocha et al 2001).
17It  should,  however,  be  stressed that the  level  of operating  fees of Latin American  open
funds tends  to be exaggerated.  This is because operating fees  are levied in the form of collection
fees  and  these  translate  into  very  high  asset  fees  during  the  first  years  of operation  of open
funds'3. Calculated over the whole  active career of workers, the fees of open funds in Chile and
several  other Latin  American countries  are much  lower and correspond to between  70 and  150
basis points of assets  under management  (James et al  1999). These fees compare favorably with
those charged by most mutual funds in the United States  and other countries but are higher than
the operating costs of employer-based closed funds (Rocha et al 2001).
The operating  fees charged by open  funds  in Latin  American  countries  may come down
as  the  systems  mature  and  regulatory  measures  are  taken  to  reduce  their  marketing  intensity
(limits on account switching, allowing multiple accounts and multiple funds, etc.)"4. Such a trend
is already evident in Chile, where operating fees have declined substantially  over the years. They
amounted  in 2000 to  a collection  fee of  13.9  percent of contributions,  equivalent  to  an average
asset  fee of less  than 70 basis  points for a 40-year  active contribution  period'5. Moreover,  what
really  matters  is  the  net  investment  return  after  deducting  operating  fees.  On  this  score  the
Chilean and other Latin American pension funds  have achieved,  and continue to report, very high
net real rates of return.
Employer-based  closed  funds  tend,  in general,  to have  lower operating  costs  as  well  as
high  investment  returns,  especially  in  Anglo-American  countries  where  they  have  tended  to
'3 Operating fees may take several different forms. Collection fees are based on contributions  and a,re similar
to the front load fees charged by most mutual funds. Asset fees are levied on account balances. Performance
fees are calculated on investment returns  in excess of a stipulated level. Exit fees are charged when workers
switch  out  of a fund.  Benefit  fees  are  levied  on  pension  payments.  In  Chile  and  most  Latin  American
countries, only collection and benefit fees are allowed. Mexico has permnitted all types of fees, but collection
fees predominate.
14  None  of the reforming  countries  in Latin  America  has imposed  limits  on operating  fees  and on  agent
commissions.  However, a strong case can be made for such limits in mandatory pension systems, especially
those offering constrained  choice.
'5 For a 40-year contribution  period, a collection  fee of 1 percent of contributions is equivalent  to an asset
fee of about 5 basis  points. This  is  a useful  simplified key,  although  it should  be borne in  mind that the
relationship between collection  and asset fees is  nonlinear. For a contribution period that covers the last 30
years before retirement, the simplified key is 7 basis points, while for a contribution period covering the last
18invest  more  heavily  in  corporate  equities  and  bonds  (Rocha  et  al  2001).  The  problem  with
employer  funds  is  that  such  good  performance  is  found  among  the  pension  funds  of  larger
employers  that  operate  the  traditional  defined-benefit  plans.  In  the  United  States,  smaller
company funds tend to incur higher operating costs, especially when they are organized as 401(k)
plans.  Operating  fees  of as  much as  200  basis points  are  not uncommon  among  such  plans. In
addition,  401(k) plans,  of both  small and  large  employers,  tend  to encourage  investment in the
equity of the  sponsoring employer,  a practice that is generally considered as highly  imprudent'6.
The basic problem with employer-based  closed  funds is that workers are captive and depend on
the  integrity and professionalism  of their employers  and the board of trustees  in pursuing good
performance.
One compromise  solution  would be to allow hybrid funds. For instance,  employer-based
plans offering  fully vested, fully funded and fully portable benefits  could give workers  the right
to  opt  out  and  join  independent  funds.  Alternatively,  group  contracts  could  be  allowed  for
independent  fund management  companies,  especially  if such  contracts  could  be negotiated  by
employers  and offered to their employees  on an optional  basis. In this way, pension funds would
benefit from economies  of scale and group discounts, but pressure would continue to be exerted
to achieve high investment returns with low operating fees.
The  operation  of  private  pension  funds  with  individual  accounts  benefits  from
considerable  economies  of scale  and there is  a persistent trend  toward greater concentration  in
pension fund  management.  In  Chile the  number of pension  funds  has  declined  from  21  in  the
early  1990s to 8 by the year 2000, while in Argentina it has fallen from 25 to  13. In Bolivia at the
start of the new system only two managers  with proven international  experience were authorized.
In  view  of this trend  and to  avoid  forcing  workers  to  save  with  noncompetitive  private  sector
institutions,  an alternative approach would allow the participation  of a fund managed  by a public
20 years before retirement it is 10 basis points.
16 In  401(k) plans, investments are  worker directed.  On average, around 30 percent of assets are invested in
the equity of sponsoring employers. But there are individual plans where company stock represents as much
as 60 to 80 percent of assets. To some extent, this pattern is explained by the matching contribution made by
employers, which is often made in company stock rather than cash. The recent collapse of Enron, the large
19sector  agency.  Argentina,  Mexico,  Kazakhstan  and  Uruguay  have  offered  this  solution.
Participation  of a publicly managed  fund  would require the creation  of a level playing  field  so
that neither the  private  nor  the public  funds  are  placed  at  a competitive  disadvantage,  to  each
other,  while  the  publicly  managed  fund  would  need  to  be  effectively  protected  from  political
interference.
A better option would be to centralize the administrative functions of pension funds (e.g.,
keeping  of records,  collection  of contributions,  payment  of benefits  and sending of statements)
and  assign  the  management  of  assets  to  a  small  number  of asset  managers  on  the  basis  of
competitive bidding and with clearly constrained asset allocation policies (Glaessner and Valdes-
Prieto  1996, James et al  1999).  Such an approach is successfully applied in the case of the Thrift
Savings  Plan  for the  Federal  Employees  Retirement  System  in  the  United  States.  Sweden  has
adopted  the  centralized  approach  to  the  administration  of  pension  funds  but  is  allowing
individual  workers  to  select from  a large  group  of asset managers  through  a system  of "blind
accounts"  whereby  the  asset  managers  would  not  know  which  workers  have  selected  them
(Palmer 2000).
A lesson of recent experience  is that reformers need to be careful when  they try to lower
operating  costs.  Centralized  collection  of  contributions  has  been  pursued  in  a  number  of
countries,  but  the  results  have  been  less  than  satisfactory,  most  notably  in  Kazakhstan  and
Poland,  because  of the  inefficiency  of the  public  agencies  used  for this  purpose.  In  the  two
countries mentioned,  contributions  were collected but individual records  were deficient  so that a
substantial  proportion  of  collected  funds  remained  unallocated  two  years  or  more  after  the
introduction  of  the  new  system.  Thus,  in  trying  to  improve  on  the  performance  of reform
programs  in other countries,  policymakers  need to ensure  that the  proposed cures  are  not worse
than the disease.
9.  What Regulation and Supervision?
US energy corporation,  has underscored  the high risk of investing in a non-diversified  portfolio.
20A  government  that  imposes  a  mandatory retirement  saving  system  has  an  obligation  to
ensure that it is safe, works well, is simple and easy to understand,  and will deliver the promised
benefits.  This  obligation  is clearly  stronger in  developing  countries  where millions  of affected
workers may lack familiarity with the workings of modern financial markets.
The main focus of regulation  should be on prudential  and protective norms and fiduciary
standards.  First and foremost  are licensing rules that should ensure that only persons  satisfying  a
stringent  "fit and  proper"  test  are  allowed  to  act  as  sponsors,  founders,  directors,  trustees  or
senior executives  of pension  funds. Other rules should require  a specified minimum capital,  asset
diversification  and  market  valuation,  external  financial  audits  and  actuarial  reviews,  and
extensive  information  disclosure  and  transparency.  Of  particular  importance  are  rules  on
adequate fund governance, well-developed internal  control systems, legal  separation of the assets
of the pension  fund from those of the management  company, and proper custodial arrangements.
All  these  prudential  and  protective  rules  are  necessary  to  ensure  the  financial  soundness  of
pension funds,  prevent fraud,  self-dealing  and other potential  conflict-of-interest  situations,  and
safeguard the interests of workers.
The  above  regulations  are  noncontroversial,  but  are  difficult  to  achieve.  Ensuring  an
efficient  and adequate  supply  of auditors,  actuaries  and custodians, not  to mention  experienced
examiners  and  supervisors,  is  a  tall  order  for  most  developing  countries.  In  Chile,  effective
external custody  of pension fund assets  was secured  by requiring all  assets to be  held with  the
central bank for safe keeping during the first ten years of the new system.  Private custodians  were
allowed  in  the  1990s.  The  development  of automated  central  securities  depositories  in  many
countries around the world has simplified the requirement for safe external custody.
Other rules that have been practiced  in Latin American  countries  are more controversial.
The  "one account per worker",  "one fund per company",  and "uniform pricing" rules have  aimed
at  ensuring  simplicity  and  transparency  and  thus  providing  protection  to  workers,  but  their
usefulness  is open  to question.  They could be justified in  systems that offer constrained  choice,
although they should probably need to be supplemented with regulations and limits on operating
21fees,  agent  commissions,  and account  switching.  They  would  be  out  of place  in  systems  that
emphasize  personal  choice.  In such systems,  they would need to be relaxed in the longer run  in
order to offer more effective choice to workers.
To enforce  compliance  with  the  whole panoply  of prudential  and protective  regulations
requires  the  creation  of  an  effective,  well-funded,  properly  staffed  and  proactive  supervision
agency  (Vittas 1998).  Latin American  countries, and to a lesser extent the reforming countries  of
Eastern  Europe,  have  been more  successful  than most OECD  countries  in developing  effective
supervision  of private  pension  funds.  Following  modern  practice,  supervisors  should  enlist the
support and cooperation of auditors, actuaries  and custodians.
In several high-income countries,  pension fund supervision lacks adequate and reasonably
up-to-date  information and is slow to take corrective action.  Given the very long-tenn nature of
pension  contracts,  it  is  imperative  to  develop  a  system  of  supervision  that  is  proactive  and
effective,  stimulates  transparency,  and ensures  compliance  with basic  prudential  and  protective
rules".
10.  What Investment Rules
Investment rules are highly controversial,  even though they are of limited relevance in the
early years of pension  reform,  mainly because accumulated pension  fund assets are initially  very
small" 8. However,  over time and as  assets start to expand,  proper investment rules are essential.
Many developing  countries have  imposed detailed investment rules for diversification  purposes
setting upper limits on different  assets by type as well as by issuer. These can be justified by the
low  level  of development  of  local  capital  markets,  the  lack of any tradition  of private pension
17  The  worst  offenders  in  this  respect  have  been the  UK  regulatory  agencies.  Not  only  in  the  area  of
pensions,  but also  in banking  and insurance,  UK regulators  have failed to adopt a proactive  approach  in
ensuring  effective  supervision.  As  a result, it is not  surprising  that the UK financial  system has suffered
from many scandals,  including the BCCI collapse,  the Maxwell  case, the Lloyds insurance market abuses,
the mis-selling of personal pension plans, and the fiasco of Equitable Life.
'8 Tight  investment  limits  on equities  and foreign  assets  should be tolerated  in the early years of pension
reform,  if adoption of conservative  policies would overcome  opposition to the implementation  of pension
reform and  authorization  of private  pension  funds.  However,  as  a practical  rule, investment  in domestic
equities  should  be  allowed  once  pension  fund  assets  reach  5 percent  of  GDP,  while  international
22provision and the lack of familiarity of most workers with complicated financial assets. However,
investment  rules should  always  emphasize  safety and profitability and  should not  aim to direct
funds into socially desirable projects.
Among  reforming  developing  countries,  Chile  has  avoided  imposing  minimum
investment  requirements  and  has  proceeded  to expand the  choice  of available  asset  classes  as
pension  funds  increased  in  size  and  maturity.  Other  countries,  including  Argentina,  Bolivia,
Mexico  and Uruguay,  have  imposed  various  minimum investment  rules,  although  a pattern  of
gradual  liberalization is also evident or intended in most countries.  Critics of investment limits
have emphasized the  losses in foregone  income that could have been  avoided by a more  liberal
system  (Shah  1997,  Srinivas  and Yermo  1999). However,  such  studies fail to take into  account
the  prevailing  conditions  in  different  countries.  In  fact,  the  performance  of mutual  funds  in
developing  countries,  which  are heavily invested  in bonds  and money market instruments,  and
the apparent lack of investor confidence in the integrity and transparency of local equity markets
strongly  suggest that in a more liberal  system, pension funds would have tended to follow more
conservative  investment  policies,  probably  achieving  lower  returns  than  under  the regulated
regime.
In  developed  countries  detailed  investment rules may not be necessary.  Reliance  on the
"prudent  expert"  rule  and  the  concept  of  benchmark  portfolios  (see  below)  may  be  quite
adequate.  Available  data show that pension funds  in countries  that rely on the "prudent  expert"
approach  have  been  able  to  achieve  higher investment  returns  than pension  funds  in countries
that  have  imposed  quantitative  limits  on  different  classes  of  assets  (Davis  1998,  European
Commission  1999).
Most developing  countries  and  several  developed  ones  either prohibit  pension  funds to
invest  in  foreign  assets  or  apply  very  tight limits  on  such  investments.  To  some  extent,  the
motivation for these  controls  is prudential  since local pension  funds may not have the expertise
to  select  foreign assets.  But to  a much  larger extent,  limits  on  foreign  assets are  motivated  by
diversification would be essential when pension fund assets exceed 20 percent of GDP.
23balance-of-payment  considerations  and by the desire to promote the development of local capital
markets.  Pension  funds  (and other  institutional  investors)  have  the  potential  to  stimulate  the
development  of local  capital  markets  (Vittas  1998b,  2000).  Although  pension funds are  neither
necessary  nor  sufficient  for  capital  market  development  (Vittas  2000),  there  is  nevertheless
considerable  empirical  evidence  showing  a close correlation  between pension  funds ('and other
institutional investors) and capital market development".
In  developing  countries  rules  that prohibit  or severely  constrain  investments  on foreign
assets  may  be  counter-productive  if  the  rest  of  the  economy  and  financial  system  are  well
integrated  with foreign markets.  For instance,  in countries  where  large utilities,  industrial firms
and  financial  institutions  are  strategically  owned by  foreign  entities,  a blanket  prohibition  on
foreign investments  would force pension funds  to invest either in large local  companies  that are
not attractive to foreign strategic owners or are too small to elicit any foreign interest.  Thus, any
investment rules on pension funds should be consistent with the degree of international  economic
integration.  This argument  is particularly  important  for the  countries of Eastern Europe that are
aiming for closer integration  with the European  Union but is also becoming increasingly relevant
for countries  in East Asia, Latin  America and the Middle East.
Much concern  is usually expressed about investment  in overseas  assets and in derivative
products. The first concern relates to the facilitation of what could be called an institutional flight
of  capital  from  developing  countries  with  poorly  functioning  capital  markets  to  high-income
countries with strongly developed and efficient markets. One solution to this problem,  advocated
by  Bodie  and  Merton  (2001),  is  to  use international  asset  swaps  with pension  funds  based  in
other  countries.  In  this  way,  international  diversification  of  pension  fund  assets  would  not
involve  a  large  outflow  of capital.  The  only  movement  of capital  across  the  exchanges  would
cover  the  net  gains  or  losses  suffered  by  national  pension  funds  in  these  asset  swaps20. As
'9  The  empirical  evidence  has  been  compiled  by Gregorio  Impavido  and Alberto Musalem  in a series  of
papers  (Catalan et 2001,  Impavido and Musalem 2000).  It is important  to note that in many countries  (e.g.
Malaysia,  Singapore  and  Switzerland)  foreign  pension  funds  and  other international  investors  may  have
been as important in stimulating local market development  as the domestic pension funds (Vittas 2000).
20  The fear of institutional  capital  flight  is one of the  main reasons  for which  policymakers  in developing
24regards,  the use of derivative products,  authorization  could be extended on an individual basis to
pension  funds  demonstrating  the  use  of effective  systems  of  asset  management  and  internal
control. This approach was formally introduced  in Switzerland in 2000, although it was practiced
informally over a longer period.
12.  What Guarantees?
Pension guarantees  can play an important part in compulsory  pension systems.  They aim
to provide  effective  protection  to  workers  but they  need to  be designed  with  care  to  avoid  the
problems  of moral  hazard  that  afflict  all  systems  of financial  guarantees.  They  can  take  four
different  forms:  a  minimum  pension;  a  minimum  investment  return;  a  minimum  annuity
conversion factor;  and protection  from insolvency.
A minimum pension  guarantee  seems essential if there is no separate  public pillar and the
social assistance  pension is  low. Chile offers  a minimum pension guarantee of about 25 percent
of  the  average  wage  to  workers  who  have  contributed  for  at  least  20  years.  Until  the  recent
reform of its public pillar, Argentina's  separate  public pillar offered a basic universal  pension of
around 30 percent of the average covered wage after a minimum contribution  period of 30 years.
Minimum  pension  guarantees  may  give  rise to  moral  hazard  problems.  If they  are not
formulated  properly,  they may  encourage  strategic  manipulation  by workers  who may  seek  to
contribute  for the  minimum  period  and  for the  minimum  amounts  that  would  entitle  them  to
draw the minimum pension.  In the case of Argentina,  the requirement of a minimum contribution
period of 30 years to  the public pillar may act  as a strong disincentive  for participation  by self-
employed  and  other  workers  who  may  be uncertain  about their future  ability to  contribute  for
such a long period.  A better alternative  for offering a minimum public  pension  (or a minimum
countries  have not shown much interest  in Kotlikoff s proposal to select an international  asset management
company  and invest all assets in a properly constructed  world index (Kotlikoff 1994). This approach  would
aim to minimize operating costs, maximize  asset diversification, achieve  an optimal combination of risk and
return, and  insulate pension fund assets from political  risk. It would also ensure that all workers of the same
cohort receive the same returns. However, the fact that no advanced country, and even no individual pension
fund  in any advanced  country,  has adopted  Kotlikoff's proposal  has weakened its  appeal for policymakers
of developing countries.
25pension guarantee  from the private pillar in the absence of a separate public  pillar) is to apply  a
proportionality  rule,  broadly  similar  to  that used for the  public  pillars  in  Switzerland  and  the
Netherlands.  Under such a rule, the state would offer (or guarantee)  an accrual factor of say 0.75
percent  of the  average  wage  for  each  year  of contribution  with  a  minimum that  would be  no
lower than  the social  assistance  pension.  Thus, for a 40-year contribution  period, the  minimum
pension guarantee would amount to 30 percent of the average wage.
A minimum  investment  return  guarantee  expressed  in  absolute  nominal  or real  terms
would not be  advisable.  It could  distort incentives  and  exert an undue influence  on investment
policies. Switzerland  requires as a minimum the annual crediting  of a 4 percent nominal return to
the "notional"  retirement accounts  that are held for each covered worker.  The minimum return is
credited  alongside  the  required  age-related  contributions.  Accumulated  balances  on  these
"notional" accounts become relevant when people change jobs and join the pension funds of their
new  employers  or on retirement.  There are no provisions  for any penalties for failure  Ito  achieve
the  minimum  return  on  an  annual  basis,  although  fund  managers  appear  to  have  adoptee
conservative  investment  policies  to ensure  that  their annual  returns  do not fall  below  this level
(Queisser and Vittas 2000).  In Singapore,  a minimum nominal return of 2.5 percent is guaranteed
but as  this is  a  state-run  plan  the guarantee  has  little  impact.  Since  it is  expressed  in  nominal
terms it also has little meaning.
Guaranteeing  the minimum  nominal  or real profitability relative  to the average  achieved
by  all  pension  funds  would  make  more  sense  since  it  would  protect  workers  from  large
deviations  in returns.  Chile requires a minimum real return that is no less than 50 percent  of the
average real  return achieved  by all pension funds on a  12-month moving  average basis (recently
extended to a 36-month basis).  Argentina imposes a similar requirement but expressed  as no less
than 70 percent of the nominal return of all pension funds.
Guaranteeing  relative  minimum  profitability  is  linked  with  minimum  solvency
requirements  and  investment  reserves.  It  results  in  more  uniform,  and  perhaps  also  more
conservative,  investment policies.  But  it can be justified  by the imposition  of the "one  account
26per  worker"  and  "one  fund per  company"  rules,  which  create  a  large  exposure  of individual
workers  to  the  performance  of individual  managers.  A minimum  relative  rate  of return  would
protect  workers  from  aberrant  behavior  by  individual  fund  managers.2'  In  both  Chile  and
Argentina, fund managers  are required to make up any shortfall  in returns from their own funds,
a provision that is not explicitly provided in the case of Switzerland.
For  more  advanced  countries,  other  solutions  may  be  more  appropriate  for protecting
workers  from excessive  fluctuations  and  deviations  in  returns.  The  "prudent  expert"  rule  has
worked  well  for  defined-benefit  plans  where  the  investment  risk  is  borne  by  sponsoring
employers,  but it remains  to  be seen  whether it will  work equally well for defined-contribution
plans. One possible  approach would be to require management companies to spell out clearly the
investment policies  of particular funds they promote and to be liable for making up any shortfalls
that  might  result  from  deviating  from  such  policies22. The  use  of  benchmark  portfolios  and
detailed  investment  guidelines  may  be  a better  approach  to  the  current  situation  in  developed
countries  where the  only constraint  on  fund management  companies  is the loss of business and
the potentially adverse impact on their reputation. These penalties on transgressors occur after the
event and offer no consolation  to retiring workers who may suffer large losses from the failure  of
fund managers to comply with their own investment guidelines.
There may be some  practical  problems  in defining benchmark portfolios,  although these
difficulties  should  not  be  exaggerated  since  benchmarks  are widely  used by pension  funds to
monitor  the performance  of asset  managers.  Formal  statement  of investment  policy  objectives
(SIPOs) are required by the new mandatory  provident  fund system of Hong Kong and it is also
practiced  on  a  less  formal  basis  in  the  United  Kingdom.  However,  no  country  requires  fund
21  The  minimum  relative  return  guarantees  used  in  Chile  and  Argentina  and  the  uniformity  of asset
portfolios  that they  induce  have come  under considerable  criticism (Shah  1997, Srinivas et al  1998).  The
criticism overlooks, however,  the need to protect individual  workers from very bad outcomes. Moreover,  the
result would not be much different from pension funds offering constrained choice of indexed funds.
22  For instance,  a pension fund may publicize  an investment policy  that allocates  60 percent of assets in a
broad equity index  and 40 percent in a broad bond index.  If it were to deviate from this policy and allocate
80 percent in equities and this resulted in a lower return than the publicized allocation it could be required to
make up the shortfall in returns.
27managers  to make up any shortfalls in returns that may result from unauthorized deviations from
the published SIPO.
No country  other than Switzerland  stipulates  a minimum  annuity conversion  factor. This
has  been  set at  7.2 percent  since the introduction  of the compulsory  system in  1985.  There are
currently  proposals  under  discussion for a  significant  decrease  in  its level  to reflect  the fall  in
interest  rates and the increase in  longevity.  The annuity conversion factor  is used when  workers
retire  and  convert  their  accumulated  balances  into  a  life  annuity.  Although  a  rminimum
conversion  factor  stipulated  in  absolute  terms  may  not  be  advisable  as  it  may  either  expose
annuity providers  to  a high  reinvestment  risk  or it may  set the  conversion  factor  at  too low  a
level, some regulation of annuity prices (as well as products) may be warranted. At the very least,
there  should be extensive  publicity and analysis  of the products  and prices  offered by different
insurance companies.
Finally,  protecting workers  from the failure  of insurance  companies  (which  provide term
life  and  disability  cover  as  well  as  annuities)  seems  essential,  especially  in  a  mandatory
retirement  saving  scheme.  To  prevent  moral  hazard  problems  and  excessive  risk  taking,  the
regulators  need  to  ensure  that  financial  institutions  have  adequate  capital  for  the  risks  they
assume,  are properly  diversified,  and are  not exposed  to a  major mismatch  of their assets  and
liabilities (Merton and Bodie 1992).
13.  How Much Individual Choice?
Individual  choice can be an essential element of a compulsory saving scheme,  although it
may seem at first glance like  a contradiction.  In Singapore and Malaysia,  individual workers can
decide  how  to  invest  their  own  balances,  above  a  stipulated  minimum  level,  provided  they
choose  among  approved  instruments.  The latter used to  be  limited to  owner-occupied  housing,
but they now cover approved mutual funds investing in domestic  and foreign securities.
In  Chile,  Argentina  and other  Latin  American  countries  individual  workers  can  choose
their  fund  management  company  and can  switch  their  account  from  company  to  company.  In
fact, account switching was a big problem in both countries as it took place on a very large scale.
28At its peak nearly one in two active accounts switched annually in Chile, while the corresponding
ratio  was  one  in three  active accounts  in Argentina.  Account  switching seemed to be motivated
by the  interests  of selling  agents  rather than  those of workers.  To  contain the level  of account
switching both countries  introduced  rules that restrict the frequency of switching to one per year,
while also requiring  more cumbersome  procedures for account switching.
In  Chile,  Argentina  and other  reforming  countries,  the "one  account  per  worker",  "one
fund per  company"  and  "uniform  pricing"  rules  seem  to  constrain  individual  choice.  Various
improvements  can be  introduced  in  these plans  to increase  individual  choice  and thus  enhance
efficiency,  while  retaining  the  compulsory  element  of  saving  for  retirement.  Some  of  these
improvements  would  make  compulsory  retirement  savings  plans  more  palatable  in  more
advanced countries.
First,  workers  could  be allowed  to hold  multiple  accounts  and management  companies
could be allowed to  operate  multiple funds.  These  could be limited to a  small number,  say no
more than three,  in order to facilitate verification of compliance.
Second, group contracts could be allowed.  These could offer discounts to group members
and could  be arranged by employers (or other groups with a common bond). Individual  workers
could be allowed to opt out of company-based  group plans, though  they might be discouraged by
the higher operating  fees  they might have  to incur by doing  so. Still,  the right to opt out would
exert pressure on group plans to earn  as good net investment returns as non-group  ones.
Third,  individual  workers  could  be  given  the right  to  invest  in  pension  funds  that are
subject  to less  regulation  (especially fewer  and less restrictive  investment  rules)  provided  they
would not be  covered  by government  protections  and guarantees.  Thus,  workers  who value the
minimum  pension  and  minimum  relative  profitability  guarantees  could  stay  with  the  (more
heavily)  regulated  funds  and  could  face  much  more  constrained  choice  in  their  investment
options.  In contrast,  workers who do not desire  such  protections  could opt for the less regulated
funds. Similarly,  if the system is based on benchmark portfolios, workers  who do not wish to be
29covered  by  state  regulations  and  protections  could  opt  for  funds  that  are  subject  to  fewer
regulations.
Finally,  and  perhaps  more  controversially,  workers  who  have  philosophical  objections
against  compulsory  saving  for retirement  purposes  could  be  allowed  to  be  exempt  from  such
plans provided they signed a declaration to that effect.  At the very least, opting not to participate
in a compulsory  system would be the result of a conscious  decision. Myopic behavior could still
influence  the  choice of young  workers, but if they had to sign such  a declaration  every three or
five  years,  they  could  realize  the  need  for  saving  for  their retirement  at an  earlier  stage  than
would otherwise be the case.
From  a practical  point of view, it would probably  be inadvisable  to  offer most of these
additional  elements  of individual  choice when  pension  reform is first implemented.  They could
be introduced at a later stage, once the private funded pillar is well established.
14.  Concluding Remarks
To recapitulate,  policies  to promote saving for retirement  and old age should ideally  use
both tax incentives and compulsion.
The case for compulsory provision is based on the need to overcome the myopic behavior
of a large minority of workers  and to protect society from those who make inadequate  provision
for their old age.
Tax inducements  may facilitate  compliance.  The socially  superior  way of providing tax
inducements  would be through a credit transfer that is added to individual capitalization accounts
provided  a  minimum  rate  of saving  is observed.  This  would  encourage  participation  by  low-
income  groups.  Allowing exemption  of contributions  within  specified  lower and  upper income
limits could also encourage  adequate saving for retirement by middle and high-income workers.
Compulsory provision imposes an obligation on the state to ensure that the system is safe,
works  well,  is simple  and easy to  understand,  and  will  deliver the targeted  benefits.  Inportant
policy issues include the extent of compulsory  coverage, the form and size of compulsory  saving,
30the  management,  regulation  and guarantees of the compulsory  system,  and finally  the extent of
individual choice.
This  paper  argues  for  imposing  compulsory  participation  on  workers  in  dependent
employment but exempting  the very young (under 25), the very old (over the normal retirement
age),  the  very  poor  (those  eaming  less  than  40  percent  of  the  average  wage)  and  the  self-
employed.  It suggests that compulsory  participation  should  take the form of individual accounts
but  with  constrained  choice  and  that  a  contribution  rate  of  10  percent  for  long-term  capital
accumulation  would be reasonable  and adequate,  although  allowing use of variable contribution
rates to attain targeted pension levels would also be advisable.
A minimum level of compulsory annuitization  should be required and this should be less
than the targeted level of compulsory  accumulation.  Balances  in excess of the minimum level of
annuitization  could be used in a more flexible way both before and after retirement. Withdrawals
for housing, education  and healthcare  could be  allowed but should not exceed the lower of 100
percent of accumulated balances  or 30 percent of projected balances  at retirement.
Management  of accumulated assets should be decentralized  but one of the fund managers
could be  a public sector agency,  provided  a level  playing field was  put in place  and the public
sector  agency  was  protected  from  political  interference.  Both  independent  open  funds  and
employer closed funds as well as group contracts could be allowed, with workers  having the right
to  opt  for  one  or the  other  type.  Vesting  and portability  rights  should  be  ensured.  Limits  on
operating fees and selling commissions as well as on the frequency of account switching could be
imposed in order to lower operating costs and fees.
The  regulatory  framework  needs  to  be  robust  and  effective.  A  whole  panoply  of
prudential and protective rules would be essential.  This should cover "fit and proper" tests for the
founders,  sponsors,  directors,  trustees,  and  senior  executives  of  pension  funds,  asset
diversification  and market valuation rules,  legal  segregation  of assets and safe extemal  custody,
independent  financial  audits and actuarial reviews, and adequate  disclosure and transparency.  An
effective,  proactive, well-funded and properly staffed supervision agency is necessary.
31Tight investment rules  could initially be justified for countries  with weak capital  markets
and limited  tradition  of private  pension  provision.  However,  in  the  long  run,  adoptlion  of the
"prudent  expert"  approach  with  publication  of  "statements  of  investment  policy  objectives
(SIPOs)"  would  be  preferable  and  more efficient.  Various  guarantees  covering  aspects  such  as
minimum  pension  levels and relative investment returns need to be  provided to protect  workers
from  aberrant  asset  managers  but  care  must be  taken  to  address  effectively  the  risk  of moral
hazard.
The  paper  also  argues  for  greater  individual  choice,  including  the  creation  of  a  dual
regulatory  structure.  One  part  would  involve  heavy  regulation  with  constrained  choice  of
investment  funds,  limits  on  operating  fees  and  on  account  switching,  and  strong  government
safeguards  and guarantees.  This would cater for those workers with low risk tolerance.  The other
part would  be more  liberal  but based  on strong  conduct rules.  It would offer greater  choice  of
investment funds, allowing  multiple accounts  and liberal  account  switching, imposing  no limits
on  operating  fees  and  providing  no  or  fewer  state  guarantees.  This  would  cater  for  workers
seeking a higher return and willing to tolerate  a higher level of risk.
The preceding discussion shows that there are many options. Decisions  on which options
to  choose  will  reflect their political  acceptability.  Clearly,  it is  easier for countries  to build  on
what  they  already  have,  unless  current  arrangements  are  totally  deficient  and  unsustainable.
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